An Iranian-Emirati Perspective on a New Gulf Security Architecture

Mehran Haghirian and Mohammed Baharoon

Bourse & Bazaar Foundation

April 7, 2026

A version of this article was originally published in French in Le Grand Continent.

Beyond the tragedy, the US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the Iranian strikes targeting the Gulf states – which continued unabated from 28 February 2026 until the April 8 ceasefire – have starkly highlighted a glaring absence: the Gulf region fundamentally lacked any security architecture.

The semblance of order that existed before the outbreak of this war was based on a polarization of how the various states in the region perceived security and threats. On the one hand, the Iranian threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and, on the other, the US threat stemming from Washington’s presence in the region dictated a fragile balance based on deterrence, external protection and ad hoc, discreet diplomacy between Iran and the Arab states. This balance has ceased to exist.

The threat is no longer merely perceived: all sides of the Gulf were ablaze.

The question is no longer whether a new regional security framework is needed, but who the actors will be, how they will interact with one another, and whether this new architecture could be purely regional — or whether it needs to extend further.

The Iranian attacks have caused a profound rift in Tehran’s relations with the Arab states on the other side of the Gulf and have undermined the tentative trust that had begun to take root through regional diplomacy over the past five years. Rebuilding that trust will be difficult and will take time. Whatever political configuration emerges in Tehran after the war, restoring relations with the Gulf states will necessarily become one of the most important priorities of any future Iranian government’s foreign policy — even if this is a consideration that the Islamic Republic’s new leaders have, for the time being, set aside.

Before the war, expert discussions on the future of the regional security architecture in the Gulf — in which we were involved — focused primarily on the new national security matrix encompassing the domains of energy, food, health and environmental security.

The war will necessitate an even broader reassessment of the Gulf’s security arrangements. And this new analytical framework will not only address the capacity to repel attacks, but it will also have to address the issue of deterrence itself.

One possible consequence of this new paradigm would be to compel the Gulf to become a highly securitised region. The Gulf Cooperation Council will inevitably engage in collective security coordination in the short term, which could include pooling stocks of interceptors, investing in next-generation air defence systems, strengthening crisis communication mechanisms, or establishing security arrangements modelled on NATO mechanisms.

These efforts are likely to become a central feature of the region’s trajectory in the near future, particularly in the context of expanding military ties with a group of countries that have proven themselves to be reliable partners.

Geopolitics of Grand Coalitions

However, contrary to what might have been expected, the resumption of discussions on a strategic alliance in the Middle East bringing together the Gulf states, Israel and the United States may not be an automatic consequence of the war.

Whilst the Iranian attacks might have accelerated such a rapprochement, this is an option that the Gulf states have so far rejected and may continue to avoid, as it would place them in a state of permanent war with a regional neighbor. The GCC states are just as concerned about the Islamic Republic as they are about Israel’s respective regional ambitions — for both powers have shown that brutal military action is their preferred means of resolving disputes. Conversely, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s tradition of patience and strategic restraint means it does not believe that military power alone leads to stability.

In the Middle East, a new order, even after this war, would not mean a total withdrawal of the United States. Nor would it mean, for those with ties to Israel, a complete reversal of that relationship.

Rather, it would involve a careful adjustment aimed at establishing a security architecture that strengthens the autonomy and agency of each state by taking into account the complex network of geopolitical ties and interests.

At the same time, the war has highlighted just how closely the security and stability of the Gulf are linked to global strategic interests: any future regional framework will almost certainly involve external actors whose economic and military presence in the region is already deeply entrenched.

China’s role as a major importer of Gulf energy, a key player in global trade networks and a guarantor of the negotiated détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia ensures that Beijing has a direct interest in preserving maritime routes, energy infrastructure and political stability in the region. Russia, which has already put forward proposals for a collective security framework at the United Nations Security Council, may seek to re-engage as debates on regional security evolve. The European Union and the United Kingdom have also strengthened their strategic and economic engagement in the region. India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil and other countries also have growing interests in the stability of the Gulf.

The diplomatic response to Iran’s attack on member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council has been global — notably with UN Security Council Resolution 2817 demanding that Iran cease its attacks, which was co-sponsored by 135 countries. This resolution was paving the way for a global response that began to manifest itself in discussions aimed at forming an alliance or consortium to maintain freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

Such frameworks could resemble initiatives similar to the global coalition in the war on terror — which would exacerbate military polarization in the region and lock both sides of the Gulf into long-term animosity that will almost certainly lead to further instability, chaos and global repercussions.

What the war has highlighted is not merely military vulnerability: it has revealed the limits of deterrence and diplomacy, as well as the fragility of food supplies, water desalination systems, airspace, maritime transport, logistics, digital infrastructure, banking reliability and tourism. A diplomatic resolution to the conflict could lay the foundations for an inclusive, realistic security framework rooted in regional cooperation. The first step, however, is to better understand the ends, not the means.

Ends Not Means

Previous proposals for dialogue, cooperation and regional security have all been rejected as insufficient.

Iran had proposed the “Hormuz Peace Endeavor.” Russia has repeatedly reiterated its idea of collective security. China has put forward the idea of transforming the region into an “oasis of security.” The Gulf Cooperation Council itself had presented the “GCC Vision for Regional Security in 2024,” which remains to this day the most comprehensive framework for cooperation in the region. Whilst none of these proposals attracted sufficient interest at the time, they all reflected a recognition that the existing order was inadequate. There has never been a serious collective effort to replace it. War now demands a change of course.

Before any meaningful de-escalation can take place, a new frame of reference will need to be established. Yesterday’s red lines have now been crossed and the region needs a collective vision of security that is not based on political consensus, but on overlapping national interests.

Without this, any de-escalation or diplomatic resolution of the conflict will merely delay the resurgence of tensions or war, without resolving the problems that have now resurfaced.

Deterrence will not be solely military in nature. It must be based on a network of interests that constitute lifelines for the region and on the realization that these — like the Strait of Hormuz — are also vital arteries for the entire world.

Amidst the barrage of missiles and drones, it was difficult to see these discussions making progress today. But ultimately, the means matter little: only the ends should guide our path towards the future.

Link: https://bourseandbazaar.substack.com/p/an-iranian-emirati-perspective-on

Photo: Canva