Mehran Haghirian
Stimson Center
August 14, 2024
The nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), particularly Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have been trying to prevent the Gaza conflict from escalating since the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
Haniyeh was killed hours after the inauguration of a new Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, which was attended by high-ranking officials from all six GCC states in a significant move showcasing a positive shift in Arab-Iran relations.
In the days following the assassination, GCC and Iranian officials engaged in numerous phone calls and bilateral discussions, including at an emergency summit Aug. 7 of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah, a meeting that was called at Iran’s request. The OIC issued a strong statement, holding Israel “fully responsible” for the “heinous attack” and calling it a “serious infringement” of Iran’s sovereignty. While Iran has reportedly rejected GCC pleas to temper its response to Haniyeh’s killing, the Arab states might succeed in convincing Tehran to limit its retaliation in light of possible new ceasefire talks.
Still, Iran’s Arab neighbors remain skeptical about the ability of Iran’s new president to moderate Iran’s foreign policy, particularly its support for militant factions across the Middle East. This skepticism is rooted in the president’s limited powers under the Iranian system and the control by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) over regional and security related files. Khamenei reiterated his prerogatives when endorsing Pezeshkian’s election victory on July 28.
Iran has consistently sought to improve relations with its Arab neighbors while supporting militant proxies that have created considerable anxiety among those same neighbors.
Considering the dire economic hardship under sanctions and mismanagement, the tense social and political situation following 2021 protests across the country, and strong resentment of the ideological nature of Iran’s foreign policy, there are strong demands for moderation inside Iran as well.
The spectrum of beliefs and approaches even within Iran’s foreign policy establishment is wide. If former President Ebrahim Raisi was positioned on the far right and his predecessor, Hassan Rouhani on the left, Pezeshkian can be viewed at the center-left of the spectrum.
However, even if Pezeshkian aims to govern as a reformist, a hardline parliament may block reformist ministers or a less ideological foreign policy agenda. Pezeshkian’s attempt to adopt a moderate approach has already encountered obstacles, including the abrupt resignation of former foreign minister Javad Zarif. Zarif had been appointed Vice President for Strategic Affairs but stepped down due to internal pressure. Without Zarif, Pezeshkian may find it even more difficult to pursue a moderate foreign policy.
Abbas Araghchi, who served as top deputy to Zarif, is expected to win confirmation to become Iran’s next foreign minister. While Araghchi was rarely involved in Middle East-related matters during his prior tenure, he was a key nuclear negotiator from 2013 to 2021. In his role as secretary of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations from 2021 until the present, Araghchi was involved in a number of track 1.5 dialogues on Iran-GCC relations, including the Iranian-Arab Dialogue held in Doha in 2022 and 2023, and in May, 2024 in Tehran. Also in May, he spoke at the Al Jazeera Forum in Doha on the war in Gaza.
Araghchi’s approach to the region is somewhat similar to that of Zarif, but with closer ties to the IRGC and less negative baggage domestically.
Both Rouhani and Zarif made concerted efforts to improve ties with GCC states, but the regional environment at the time – in the leadup to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and after the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, prompting Iranian countermeasures — inhibited meaningful progress. During Rouhani’s presidency, tensions remained high, especially with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE.
Zarif often stated that Iran’s neighbors were its priority and he tried to set the stage for regional dialogue through his proposed Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE). Oman and Qatar reciprocated the outreach, but the other GCC states were more concerned with the IRGC’s actions in the region and perceived Rouhani and Zarif to lack influence over Iran’s decision-making. They were also uncomfortable with Iran’s direct engagement with the United States during the nuclear negotiations and worried that the deal would ease Iran’s isolation by the West.
Even before the JCPOA’s implementation in January 2016, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain had cut all relations with Iran, while the UAE and Kuwait downgraded ties, following the Saudi response to an attack on its embassy in Tehran. Regional tensions escalated to an all-time high during Donald Trump’s presidency, with the region witnessing consequential military attacks, including on ships in the Persian Gulf and oil installations in the Arabian Peninsula. The U.S. assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, coupled with ongoing proxy conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, further strained relations.
However, because tensions had reached their peak and the dire consequences were understood, regional players recalibrated their policies in favor of diplomacy and dialogue. There was a collective realization that ambitious development agendas and national visions could not succeed under the shadow of military conflicts in the Persian Gulf.
With Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential elections and the arrival of Raisi as Iran’s president, a new opportunity for direct diplomacy arose. As a hardliner close to the IRGC, Raisi somewhat resolved a main Arab concern in dealing with Tehran as the Arabs no longer perceived a duality in the Iranian approach. Moreover, with an intra-GCC conflict with Qatar ending around the same time, there was also a GCC consensus on reaching out to Tehran. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait reestablished diplomatic ties and preparations have been made for Iran to restore relations with Bahrain.In May, all six GCC states sent letters of condolence to Iran after the death of Raisi in a helicopter crash. They also dispatched high-level delegations to Raisi’s funeral.
Since 2021, the GCC states have, individually and collectively, expressed support for the revival of the nuclear deal, the lifting of sanctions, and deeper engagement with Iran. The GCC Vision for Regional Security, published in March 2024, also calls for enhancing “economic cooperation between regional countries in a way that serves the interests of dialogue, communication, and building bridges.”
Despite the pledges, the combined non-oil trade between the six GCC states and Iran stood at around $26.41 billion in the fiscal year ending in March 2023, a fraction of its potential. For those that prefer to expand economic engagements with Tehran, lifting U.S. secondary sanctions is key.
The United States, meanwhile, sought to expand the Abraham Accords to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and to establish an anti-Iran alliance through initiatives like the Middle East Air Defense Alliance or the Abraham Alliance proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The U.S. has also promoted regional integration through the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), which would effectively bypass Iran to connect the Persian Gulf with Israel and beyond. Additionally, the U.S. is proposing to sign a bilateral defense pact with Saudi Arabia that would include assistance in building a Saudi nuclear energy program. The stated U.S. goal is to limit China’s growing economic influence in the region, alongside countering Iran.
However, the narrative of an official anti-Iran alliance runs counter to both GCC statements and actions. For Saudi Arabia, as well as Bahrain and the UAE, normalization with Israel is tied to broadening their strategic reach, expanding security and economic partnerships, and achieving a resolution of the Palestinian issue, not necessarily to counter Iran. The post-Oct. 7, 2023, situation in the broader Middle East and subsequent developments have showcased the limits of U.S. and Israeli goals in the region.
Even if Trump returns to the presidency, GCC states do not seem eager to return to an era of maximum regional hostilities and will likely push to strengthen regional diplomacy. While the current détente with Iran is fragile, all regional players seem intent on maintaining, if not expanding, diplomatic engagement. Most importantly, no country in the region wants to be dragged into another war. This incentivizes countries to resolve the Iran nuclear issue as well as to achieve a Gaza cease-fire.
Pezeshkian will surely try to strengthen relations with Iran’s Arab neighbors, thwart possible attempts at establishing an anti-Iran alliance, and actively pursue economic diplomacy and regional integration. Days before his inauguration, he wrote in an article published in Arabic, “I extend the hand of friendship and brotherhood to all neighbors and countries of the region to launch a real and serious movement in the process of cooperation.”
Link to the article: https://www.stimson.org/2024/constraints-facing-gcc-iran-diplomacy-under-pezeshkian/
Photo Credit: Sharjah24
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