Nuclear Diplomacy in the Gulf: Exploring Pathways for Regional Nuclear Energy Cooperation between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE

Mehran Haghirian

Published as part of the SALAM project, PRISME

July 2025

Download: https://prismeinitiative.org/publications/nuclear-diplomacy-gulf-regional-energy-cooperation-iran-saudi-uae-mehran-haghirian/

The June 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities shattered assumptions about the inviolability of safeguarded sites and underscored the urgent need to reimagine nuclear diplomacy in the Gulf—where the ambitions of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) present both grave risks and critical opportunities for regional cooperation. While Iran’s program has long been a source of tension, Saudi Arabia’s emerging aspirations and the UAE’s operational reactors add new layers to the security dynamics of the Persian Gulf.

Since 2021, de-escalation between Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—alongside renewed Iran-US nuclear talks in 2025—had opened space to explore civilian nuclear cooperation among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. While the geopolitical context has shifted dramatically since June, the foundational logic of civilian nuclear diplomacy remains intact. The strikes have not erased Iran’s enrichment capability or its political will—only reinforced the need for transparency, oversight, and regional frameworks that reduce the incentives for unilateralism or military actions. As this memo argues, technical collaboration and environmental risk management offer pragmatic entry points to reduce tensions and build trust in a region as environmentally fragile, politically volatile, and highly interdependent as the Gulf.

All three countries operate or have planned constructing nuclear facilities along the Gulf’s coastline, where rising water temperatures, regional tensions, and lack of coordination amplify humanitarian and ecological risks. These shared vulnerabilities could provide a functional and strategic foundation for trust-building cooperation. The recent attacks by Israel and the United States also exposed the potential catastrophic consequences of military escalation involving civilian nuclear sites.

This memo explores how regional frameworks for nuclear safety, environmental risk mitigation, and technical coordination could help manage shared risks. It argues that civilian nuclear diplomacy can facilitate non-proliferation and enhance regional governance.

While Iran is not currently assessed to be pursuing nuclear weapons, the evolving security environment and reduced inspection access demand reinforced verification to restore confidence in its peaceful intent. Military strikes cannot resolve this enduring international concern; a renewed, enforceable, and inclusive agreement is essential.

To advance this vision, the memo outlines a four-track framework: (1) nuclear safety and emergency preparedness, (2) civilian nuclear collaboration, (3) a regional nuclear enrichment consortium, and (4) environmental risk mitigation. These tracks are designed as achievable, technically-grounded steps that could be supported by both regional stakeholders and international institutions.

Ultimately, the goal is to reimagine Gulf security through regional agency and multilateral governance. By promoting interdependence and transparency, nuclear energy cooperation could mitigate proliferation risks and contribute to a more resilient and sustainable Gulf security order.

Nuclear Energy Strategy and Ambition in the Gulf

Iran’s nuclear program, launched in the 1950s under the U.S.-backed “Atoms for Peace” initiative, has become a central symbol of sovereignty and technological resilience. While Iran has consistently defended its right to peaceful nuclear energy under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its program has triggered decades of scrutiny, sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and now military action. The Bushehr nuclear power plant, operational since 2011, remains the centerpiece of Iran’s civilian capacity and was untouched during the June 2025 strikes—though the program’s political symbolism still outweighs its technical and economic utility.1

Saudi Arabia, by contrast, announced its nuclear ambitions in 2009, citing domestic energy needs, desalination, and economic diversification, but also largely driven by rivalry with Iran. Despite multiple cooperation agreements, Riyadh has yet to sign a formal agreement with the United States or adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Additional Protocol.2 Its first Low Power Research Reactor opened in 2018, but progress remains modest relative to stated goals.3

The UAE presents a different model: state-led, internationally compliant, and technically advanced, its program is designed to project modernity and peaceful intent. The Barakah plant, built by a South Korean consortium, is now “generating 40 TWh of electricity a year, and provides up to 25% of the UAE’s electricity,”4 making it the Arab world’s leading operational nuclear power station.

These programs are not merely infrastructure projects—they are instruments of strategic signaling and symbolic competition.5 Political mistrust has historically limited transparency, information-sharing, and regulatory alignment. Yet recent diplomatic openings since 2021 suggest that technical cooperation may be feasible even without full political normalization. Against the backdrop of the continued asymmetries6 and growing complexity of global nuclear governance, shared safety and environmental risks could gradually shift elite preferences toward less securitized, more pragmatic forms of engagement.

All three countries are pursuing nuclear energy as part of a broader diversification strategy. As rentier economies reliant on fossil fuels, they seek to reduce their reliance on oil and gas, free up hydrocarbons for export, and meet growing domestic energy demands. Nuclear energy, alongside solar and wind, is part of this recalibrated mix. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE’s strategic ambitions and financial capacity make such investments feasible.

The UAE’s swift progress contrasts with Iran’s constrained capacity, which—even as it enriches uranium to 60%—remains hampered by sanctions and lack of access to key technologies. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)7, signed in 2015, temporarily eased these limits, but U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent rollback of commitments reignited concerns over the military dimensions of enrichment. The 2025 strikes heightened these concerns while demonstrating that military solutions do not provide long-term safeguards.

The opacity surrounding Iran’s enrichment activities and the sophistication of its nuclear infrastructure have led regional and global actors to view its program through a lens of strategic ambiguity, while also fueling Saudi and Emirati nuclear ambitions since the early 2000s. In January 2025, Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister declared: “We will enrich [uranium] and we will sell it and we will do a ‘yellowcake.”8 Such statements, combined with limited transparency and stalled negotiations with Washington, deepen global concerns over proliferation risks in the Gulf.9

While Saudi Arabia’s energy needs—like those of Iran and the UAE—are legitimate, its nuclear strategy remains institutionally underdeveloped, with weak regulatory frameworks and no operational power-generating reactors. In contrast, the UAE’s approach has been anchored in its 2009 “123 Agreement” with the United States, renouncing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities—considered the “gold standard” of nuclear cooperation.10 It is party to the NPT Additional Protocol, and has an independent regulatory body, the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR).

Despite international praise, the UAE’s program has raised environmental concerns in neighboring Qatar and Kuwait.11 The Barakah plant’s coastal location heightens the risk of transboundary impacts. Still, the UAE’s transparent, institutionalized model offers a credible reference point for regional cooperation.

Within the Gulf, the UAE has forgone enrichment; Saudi Arabia is actively exploring uranium mining and seeks enrichment; while Iran continues to assert its right to enrichment, recognized under the NPT and JCPOA. Against this backdrop, enrichment remains a strategic flashpoint and central to renewed nuclear talks, which will likely resume in the aftermath of the June 22 U.S. attacks on Iran.

Before the attacks, U.S.–Iran talks in Oman explored an unprecedented idea: a joint enrichment facility on Iranian soil involving Saudi Arabia and the UAE.12 A Gulf-based consortium could provide a secure, peaceful, and technically viable path to a shared nuclear fuel cycle, building on existing multilateral initiatives, such as the IAEA-backed Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank.

Other GCC states would likely support such efforts. Oman and Qatar have facilitated U.S.–Iran dialogue and endorsed cooperative frameworks,13 while Kuwait and Bahrain—though quieter—have not opposed renewed talks and could back regional consensus through GCC institutions.14 On July 16, Bahrain and the United States signed an agreement on strategic nuclear cooperation.15

The region’s de-escalatory trajectory since 2021 creates an opening, a less securitized environment,16 even as political and institutional hurdles persist. The shared interests and opportunities identified here warrant high-level attention: while nuclear diplomacy is inherently political, technical cooperation can build confidence and foster sustainable interdependence.

Shared Nuclear Risks and Strategic Interdependencies in the Gulf

Despite diverging political agendas and institutional approaches, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE share key vulnerabilities in their nuclear energy programs—particularly environmental risks, nuclear safety, and transboundary exposure. The Gulf’s geographic proximity, ecological fragility, and infrastructural interconnectedness make nuclear governance an inherently regional issue. Yet no shared regulatory framework or safety coordination mechanism exists. Establishing one could serve both as a practical safeguard and a foundation for broader Gulf security dialogue.

The absence of a joint safety framework or operational coordination for emergency response significantly increases the risk of cascading crises. A localized incident could easily trigger humanitarian, ecological, and economic fallout across multiple states. The military targeting of Iranian nuclear sites has turned hypothetical safety concerns into urgent security threats. The risk of radiological contamination, accidental or otherwise, now looms over neighboring Gulf states, including those without nuclear programs.

While the UAE has developed robust regulatory institutions and adheres to international safety standards, similar preparedness is not guaranteed elsewhere. Moreover, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all lack mechanisms for coordinated crisis response. A major incident at Bushehr, Barakah, or any research reactor would likely overwhelm national capabilities and ripple across the region.

The June 2025 attacks have further constrained international oversight, as IAEA inspectors have not returned to Iranian facilities since then, raising serious concerns about verification. The strikes also exposed the absence of emergency protocols for military attacks on nuclear facilities, underscoring the need for civil-military coordination on nuclear risk reduction. Despite GCC attempts to anticipate the risks and consequences through the IAEA, there was no effective forum to provide guidance during the crisis.17

As IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warned during a UN Security Council briefing on June 20, strikes on Iranian facilities could cause a “very high release of radioactivity to the environment”, with effects extending hundreds of kilometers, requiring mass evacuations, population sheltering, and food restrictions.

Emergency preparedness should be treated as a core regional security priority, not a technical afterthought. This is critical in a context of enduring mistrust and escalation risks, including cyberattacks or acts of sabotage, as exemplified by the Houthis’ claimed targeting of Barakah in 201718, and amid renewed tensions that could again place nuclear infrastructure in the crosshairs.

All three countries also have or plan to develop nuclear facilities along the Gulf’s shores. This increases shared environmental vulnerability, exacerbated by climate change. Rising water temperatures affect cooling systems essential for safe reactor operation, reducing efficiency and stressing the region’s fragile ecosystems. Thermal discharge from nuclear plants—especially when combined with large-scale desalination—worsens marine degradation, exacerbates atmospheric pollution, and accelerates regional warming. These effects are transboundary by nature and threaten the Gulf’s biodiversity, fisheries, water quality, and human health. In a semi-enclosed marine environment, such risks cannot be contained by borders.

While the UAE can monitor environmental impacts, Iran faces too many constraints to develop similar capacities, and Saudi Arabia’s regulatory system is still maturing. This uneven capacity makes regional monitoring and coordinated mitigation strategies both technically advisable and politically necessary.

Meanwhile, enrichment remains a flashpoint. As uncertainty persists over the prospect of a Saudi-U.S. enrichment agreement—and over the durability of any potential new deal with Iran beyond 2029—regional solutions must also be considered. A Gulf-based enrichment consortium remains a viable and potentially stabilizing long-term option.19

This memo’s policy recommendations account for the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran engagement and sanctions relief but do not depend on a formal breakthrough. The urgency of nuclear safety, environmental monitoring, and institutional coordination is growing—and demands immediate and coordinated action. Structural risks transcend diplomatic timelines. Progress in these domains can, and should, proceed even in the absence of a negotiated solution.

A Framework for Regional Nuclear Cooperation

Without cooperation, Gulf states’ nuclear ambitions will entail higher costs, reduced efficiency, and greater risk. Establishing a regional platform on nuclear safety could address these vulnerabilities while serving as a confidence-building measure. The region’s deepening technical and environmental interdependence provides a foundation for a new Gulf security architecture that is inclusive, cooperative, and future-oriented.

The proposed framework rests on four mutually reinforcing tracks of cooperation between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE that envision alternative futures beyond militarization and coercion: (1) nuclear safety and emergency preparedness, (2) civilian nuclear cooperation, (3) a nuclear enrichment consortium, and (4) environmental risk mitigation.

Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedness

A regional nuclear safety platform is the most immediate and achievable step toward meaningful cooperation. Prioritizing shared protocols and coordinated responses, it could begin with IAEA-facilitated workshops and evolve into a permanent mechanism under IAEA auspices with international technical support by the EU, China, and even the U.S. Its focus on technical risk management—rather than politics—makes it a suitable entry point for cooperation despite strategic competition.

Core components would include a Gulf-wide safety forum led by national regulators and supported by IAEA experts. Joint simulation exercises, emergency protocols, and workshops on safety culture would form the backbone of cooperation. Ultimately, the platform would aim to establish regional early-warning systems and data-sharing channels, especially for incidents affecting air and water quality across borders.

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

Civilian nuclear energy could significantly advance electricity generation, water desalination, and medical applications across the Gulf. Joint investment in training and knowledge exchange would maximize returns on existing infrastructure and build confidence among engineers, researchers, and younger professionals. It could also support future electricity interconnection initiatives.

A Gulf-based civilian nuclear cooperation initiative would focus on three core streams: nuclear energy for desalination, clean energy generation, and medical applications. In the medical domain, this would include a regional program for producing and distributing nuclear medicine, alongside joint training for radiologists, technicians, and regulators. The three countries could also establish shared Research and Development centers for civilian nuclear applications, supported by national universities and reinforced through workshops with the IAEA and international partners.

The European Union is well-positioned to support this track through its political and technical ties with all three countries and its Euratom Treaty as a tested model for regional nuclear governance. China could also play a mediating role. International backing would strengthen multilateralism and regional institutional resilience while also reducing proliferation risks.

Nuclear Enrichment Consortium

One of the more ambitious proposals for regional cooperation—the establishment of a joint nuclear enrichment consortium—has shifted from diplomatic option to regional imperative after the 2025 strikes. A jointly administered facility could defuse tensions around unilateral enrichment and establish verifiable controls in a volatile security environment. It has gained new relevance amid stalled nuclear talks with Iran and Saudi Arabia’s push for enrichment.20 A regional facility—possibly on an Iranian island or mainland site near Gulf waters—would provide access to nuclear fuel under international safeguards while mitigating strategic concerns posed by national enrichment programs.

The initiative’s success would hinge on strong international backing. The five permanent UN Security Council members could provide legal, technical, and political guarantees while empowering the IAEA to oversee compliance. A robust international participation would not only strengthen verification but also deter future attacks, reinforcing the principle that safeguarded sites are inviolable. Additional support could come from nuclear-capable countries with existing Gulf ties—such as South Korea, Japan, India, and Brazil—through infrastructure development, regulatory expertise, and technical assistance.

Though politically sensitive, such a consortium could reduce proliferation risks, strengthen international trust, and promote multilateral engagement. Over time, it could evolve into a Gulf-based nuclear fuel bank—similar to the IAEA’s LEU Bank in Kazakhstan—securely storing and distributing fuel under international oversight. With uranium mining in Saudi Arabia, enrichment in Iran, and storage possibly in the UAE, this arrangement could provide a structured, rules-based system anchored in regional and global cooperation.

A joint enrichment facility—backed by U.S., European, and Chinese technical guarantees—is not only feasible but increasingly necessary to prevent further escalation in the region. Given the damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the fragile state of renewed nuclear negotiations, a temporary pause on enrichment should accompany the launch of a consortium plan grounded in technical and political realism.

Environmental Risk Mitigation

Given the ecological sensitivity of the Gulf and the expanding footprint of nuclear and desalination infrastructure, regional environmental cooperation is urgent. The region’s dependence on coastal waters for cooling, desalination, and food production renders environmental degradation not just a technical issue, but a shared security concern.

This track proposes a joint monitoring and research network focused on critical indicators—coastal temperature, salinity, biodiversity, and pollution linked to nuclear and desalination processes. Beyond the physical vulnerabilities of nuclear infrastructure, the recent attacks have exposed the Gulf’s environmental fragility: any radiological incident could spread contamination across borders for years. Shared protocols for water intake and thermal discharge would help protect marine ecosystems and public health while reducing long-term ecological risks.

Although nuclear policy in the Gulf has largely avoided public scrutiny, concerns over safety, spillover effects, and disaster preparedness are rising. Regional cooperation can help build public trust through transparency, dialogue, and public education.21 Technical forums involving scientists, academics, and civil society could help reframe nuclear energy as a platform for collective sustainability rather than political rivalry.

The Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME)—the only institution including all eight Gulf littoral states—could expand its mandate to monitor and manage nuclear-related risks, leveraging its institutional footprint to coordinate marine protection and nuclear environmental governance.

Conclusion

The nuclear trajectories of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are reshaping the Gulf’s strategic and environmental landscape. While risks of proliferation, miscalculation, and ecological degradation remain significant, shared geography, technical vulnerabilities, and common energy needs offer a largely untapped basis for cooperation.

The rationale for regional nuclear collaboration is strong, but the political and institutional path forward remains fraught. Structural asymmetries and strategic rivalries continue to constrain national decision-making. The June 2025 strikes on Iran underscored the dangers of strategic miscalculation and uncoordinated escalation, reinforcing the need for institutionalized crisis management and cross-border nuclear governance. This memo has outlined a pragmatic framework with feasible entry points for engagement.

Despite the recent attacks, Iran’s program remains an enduring international concern. Military action has not eliminated enrichment capacity—only highlighted the urgency of a structured, enforceable agreement to govern its future trajectory. Without a collective framework for nuclear safety and environmental governance, the Gulf risks compounding technical, normative, and strategic threats. A single nuclear accident or targeted sabotage could trigger humanitarian and ecological crises and harden divides in ways that foreclose future cooperation for decades.

The alternative is equally clear. Functional, low-stakes collaboration on safety protocols, emergency preparedness, environmental monitoring, and peaceful nuclear applications can lay the groundwork for institutional maturity and deeper regional integration. If sustained, these efforts can help shift mindsets from zero-sum rivalry to shared responsibility.

This memo offers a new vantage point on nuclear politics in the Gulf: cooperation need not start from trust but from shared vulnerability. With support from the IAEA and key international partners, nuclear energy can evolve from a source of tension into a platform for building confidence, capability, and cooperation.

In a region long shaped by militarization and energy geopolitics, nuclear cooperation presents a rare and consequential opportunity for regional resilience, sustainable development, and a more inclusive security architecture. Even modest progress could prove transformative.

Al Jazeera, ‘Iran says nuclear-power plant “operational”’, 4 September 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/9/4/iran-says-nuclear-power-plant-operational.

Arab News, ‘Officials discuss Saudi-South Korean cooperation in nuclear power and defense’, 24 May 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2579071/saudi-arabia; EDF, ‘Nuclear in Saudi Arabia’, EDF Saudi Arabia, 2025, https://ksa.edf.com/en/our-activities/nuclear-in-saudi-arabia; China Atomic Energy Authority, ‘CNNC agrees to collaborate with Saudi Arabia’, 2025, https://www.caea.gov.cn/english/n6759361/n6759363/c6794014/content.html.

Al Jazeera, ‘Bin Salman launches Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear plant project’, 5 November 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/11/5/bin-salman-launches-saudi-arabias-first-nuclear-plant-project.

Nuclear Engineering International, ‘Barakah now fully operational’, 10 September 2024, https://www.neimagazine.com/news/barakah-npp-fully-operational/.

Mohammad Al-Saidi and Mehran Haghirian, ‘A quest for the Arabian atom? Geopolitics, security, and national identity in the nuclear energy programs in the Middle East’, Energy Research & Social Science, vol. 69, 2020. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214629620301584.

Hassan Elbahtimy, ‘Whose Nuclear Disorder? The Middle East in Global Nuclear Politics’, PRISME Initiative, 2025.

U.S. Department of State, ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, 14 July 2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/.

Al Jazeera, ‘Saudi Arabia announces plans to enrich and sell uranium’, 14 January 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/14/saudi-arabia-announces-plans-to-enrich-and-sell-uranium.

Pesha Magid, ‘Exclusive: Under Trump, Saudi civil nuclear talks delinked from Israel recognition, sources say’, Reuters, 8 May 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/under-trump-saudi-civil-nuclear-talks-delinked-israel-recognition-sources-say-2025-05-08/.

10Arms Control Association, ‘The U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 At a Glance’, September 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/us-atomic-energy-act-section-123-glance.

11Li-Chen Sim, ‘Nuclear Power in the Middle East: The Politics of Stakeholder Coalitions’, Arab Gulf States Institute, 17 September 2020, https://agsi.org/analysis/nuclear-power-in-the-middle-east-the-politics-of-stakeholder-coalitions/.

12Amwaj Media, ‘Exclusive: Can “nuclear consortium” bridge Iran-US divide?’, 13 May 2025, https://amwaj.media/en/article/can-a-regional-nuclear-consortium-bridge-iran-us-divide.

13Oman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘US and Iran agree to enter further round of nuclear talks’, 19 April 2025, https://www.fm.gov.om/us-and-iran-agree-to-enter-new-phase-of-nuclear-talks/; Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Qatar welcomes Oman’s hosting of US-Iran talks’, 8 April 2025, https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/qatar-welcomes-oman%27s-hosting-of-us-iran-talks.

14Mehran Haghirian, ‘Constraints Facing GCC-Iran Diplomacy Under Pezeshkian’, Stimson Center, 14 August 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/constraints-facing-gcc-iran-diplomacy-under-pezeshkian/; Kuwait News Agency, ‘Kuwait calls for regional cooperation on nuclear safety’, 25 May 2025, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=3225796&language=en.

15United States Department of State, ‘United States and Bahrain Sign Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation’, 16 July 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/united-states-and-bahrain-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-concerning-strategic-civil-nuclear-cooperation

16Mehran Haghirian, ‘Constructive Diplomatic Shifts in the Geopolitical Landscape of the Gulf’, in Mediterranean Transitions from the Gulf to the Sahel: The Role of Italy and the EU, eds. Giulia Daga and Pier Paolo Raimondi, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2024, pp. 81-102. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/c02/mediterranean-transitions-gulf-sahel.

17Mostafa Salem, ‘Anxiety grips Gulf Arab states over threat of nuclear contamination and reprisals from Iran’, CNN, June 19, 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/18/middleeast/gulf-anxiety-iran-strikes-nuclear-contamination-latam-intl

18Reuters, ‘Yemen’s Houthi group says fires missile toward Abu Dhabi nuclear reactor’, 3 December 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/yemens-houthi-group-says-fires-missile-toward-abu-dhabi-nuclear-reactor-idUSKBN1DX09E/.

19Tytti Erästö, ‘Following Israeli attacks, Iran and other Gulf states could prevent endless war through regional non-proliferation cooperation’, PRISME Initiative, 2025. https://prismeinitiative.org/publications/israeli-attacks-iran-gulf-regional-non-proliferation-cooperation-tytti-erasto/.

20Amwaj Media, ‘Exclusive: Can “nuclear consortium” bridge Iran-US divide?’, 13 May 2025, https://amwaj.media/en/article/can-a-regional-nuclear-consortium-bridge-iran-us-divide.

21See Hisham Soliman, ‘Promising a Sustainable Energy Future in a Diversified Economy: Overcoming the Risky Legacy of Nuclear Energy’, PRISME Initiative, 2025.